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INTRODUCTION 
The United States contributes fifteen percent of the world’s greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions while making up only four percent of the world’s
population.1 In recent years, the United States has made progress towards
reducing the amount of GHGs we put into the atmosphere. However, there 
is the fear that the current administration is attempting to curtail regulations. 
In 1935, the federal government passed the Federal Power Act creating 
two distinct jurisdictions over the energy market.2 This was in response to
a gap in jurisdictional coverage between the states and federal government 
known as the Attleboro Gap.3 Interstate wholesale sales were to be regulated 
by the Federal Power Commission (now known as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC)), and states would control energy generation, 
siting, and most importantly retail sales.4 For eighty-one years this dual 
sovereignty model governed how electric energy distribution was managed 
throughout the country. 
In 2016, the Supreme Court ruled on two cases that changed the way
we look at the divide between federal and state power in the energy industry. 
First, FERC v. EPSA established a new “bright line” rule and expanded
federal authority to regulate energy markets by preempting a state challenge 
to a FERC order that “affected” retail sales.5 Then, Hughes v. Talen further
extended federal authority by ruling that a state’s attempt to interfere within 
the sphere of FERC regulatory authority was preempted.6 The new concurrent
jurisdiction approach to energy regulation seems here to stay. Two circuit 
courts recently applied EPSA and Hughes finding regulations enacted by 
the two states were not preempted by the FPA.7 This solidifies the new 
concurrent jurisdiction model EPSA and Hughes laid out. 
States have increasingly enacted legislation to help combat climate change
especially through GHG emission regulation. The Renewable Portfolio 
1. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Global Greenhouse Case Emissions 
Data, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/
KGP4-MZLA] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
2.  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2012). 
3. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
4.  16 U.S.C. § 824a. 
5. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (hereinafter FERC
v. EPSA). 
6.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). 
7. See generally Coalition for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 17‐2654, at *1
(2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2018); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 17‐2433, 2018 WL 4356683, 
at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018). 
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Standards (RPS) is a main method used by states.8 An RPS is a state-
mandated percentage of electric energy that must be supplied to retail 
customers by renewable sources.9 California recently passed SB 100,
which increased the percentage requirements of RPSs through 2045. Most 
notably, SB 100 mandates 60 percent renewable energy sources by 2030, 
and 100 percent by 2045. California is the second state in the country, after 
Hawaii, to create a mandate of 100 percent renewable energy.10 
In an administrative climate hostile to regulation combating climate
change, California’s desire to push the envelope and make meaningful 
attempts to curb climate change is noble. However, its effort leaves the 
state open to federal challenges of preemption under the FPA, possibly 
leading to a one step forward two steps back precedent that would change 
states’ ability to combat climate change. 
I. PREEMPTION IN THE ENERGY MARKET
A. The Supremacy Clause
Article VI, paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution states: “This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”11 Under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law preempts contrary state law. Preemption can be subdivided 
into two subcategories: (1) express preemption, and (2) implied preemption.12 
Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly states that a certain
law preempts state law.13 Implied preemption occurs when it can be inferred
from the language of the statute that Congress intended to preempt state 
law.14 Implied preemption can be broken down into two further categories:
field and conflict preemption.15 Field preemption is implied when Congress 
8. See Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Square Pegs for Round Climate Change Holes?, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
183, 185 (2010). 
9. Id.
10.  Act of Sept. 10, 2018, ch. 312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified 
at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. 
12. See Jennifer Ko, Comment, The Nuclear Option: What Can States Do To
Encourage Clean Energy After Hughes and EPSA?, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1274 (2018) 






























     
  
has legislated so extensively in an area as to occupy the entire field.16 
Conflict preemption is either direct or implied when there is a conflict between
federal and state law as to not allow the observance of one without coming 
into conflict with the other.17 In either case, express or implied, the court 
has stated that “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.”18 
Recently, field preemption was used to determine the proper balance
between federal and state laws in the energy market—first under the FPA, 
and second under the Natural Gas Act.19 The Supreme Court has ruled that
when determining field preemption, the question hinges on whether “the
target at which the state law aims” is under FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.20 
Therefore, field preemption under the FPA is not only determined by
Congress’s exclusive legislation, but also by the target of the state law.
This paper will look exclusively at preemption under the Federal Power 
Act in the context of recent laws passed in California. 
B. The Federal Power Act 
Passed in 1935, the FPA was enacted to fill a gap in jurisdictional
coverage in the energy market. In 1927, the Supreme Court ruled in Public 
Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.
that states had no regulatory authority over interstate commerce by electric
utilities.21 However, at that time there was no federal agency created by 
Congress to regulate the interstate energy market. The gap in regulation 
became known as the “Attleboro Gap.”22  Congress enacted the FPA to fill 
this gap and regulate interstate energy markets. In the FPA, Congress gave 
authority to the Federal Power Commission (now known as FERC) to
regulate interstate wholesale energy sales.23 
While the FPA grants FERC jurisdiction over interstate and wholesale 
power sales, the authority does not extend to “any other sale of electric
16. Id.
 17. Id.
18. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (quoting Altria Group, 
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)). 
19. See id.; Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015). 
20. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
21. See generally Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927).
 22. Scott Jacobson, Note, Dual Sovereignty Is Out, Time for Concurrent Jurisdiction to
Shine, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 627, 629 (2018). 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012) (In 1935 when the FPA was enacted the regulatory 
agency granted authority over the interstate wholesale markets was the Federal Power 
Commission). 
4
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energy.”24 Section 201(a) of the FPA states that federal regulation authority
“extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the 
States.”25 Further, sections 205 and 206 grant FERC exclusive authority
to regulate commerce and rates within interstate wholesale sales and the 
transmission of such electricity within the interstate market.26 
Under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court held that the FPA as
enacted by Congress created a “bright line” separation of federal and state 
jurisdiction.27 Federal jurisdiction covered the rates, terms, and provisions
of all wholesale sales or transmission of electricity within the interstate 
market.28 Covered under this federal jurisdiction is FERC’s authority to
determine and establish reasonable wholesale rates. As stated in Mississippi 
Power & Light, “FERC has exclusive authority to set and to determine the 
reasonableness of wholesale rates.”29 However, per section 201(a), all other 
regulations are reserved to the states.30 
C. Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
1. The 2016 FERC v. EPSA Decision 
In 2016, the Supreme Court altered the “bright line” separating federal 
and state authority by expanding federal authority over energy regulation 
in FERC v. EPSA.31 In 2011, FERC issued Order 745, which attempted to
“ensure ‘just and reasonable’ wholesale rates by requiring market operators 
to appropriately compensate demand response providers and thus bring 
about ‘meaningful demand-side participation’ in the wholesale markets.”32 
More simply, this rule required demand response resources to be allowed
to compete in wholesale markets. Demand response is a method of
encouraging people to conserve energy during peak consumption time, or 
when the grid is strained.33 Generally, the cost of compensating consumers
24. Id. § 824(b)(1).
25. Id. § 824(a). 
26. Id. § 824(d)–(e). 
27.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
 28. Steven Ferrey, Supreme Court Shifts Supremacy Doctrine-Preempting State
Sustainability?, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 523 (2018). 
29. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988).
30.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
31.  FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774. 
32. Id. at 771. 
33. See id. at 770.
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for their energy conservation is less than building or buying emergency 
energy to supply additional power at peak usage times.34 
FERC Order 745 required Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)35 
and Independent System Operators (ISOs)36 to accept market bids from
demand response resources and in return compensate their bids the same 
as if the RTO or ISO had purchased power from a power generation source.37 
Under cooperative federalism, FERC Order 745 allows state regulators to 
prohibit their customers from bidding on demand response in the wholesale 
market.38 However, demand response marketing is a method of conserving
energy by customers, not a sale of energy in the interstate wholesale market 
regulated by the FPA, meaning that FERC did not have jurisdiction under 
section 201 of the FPA. Instead, FERC relied on sections 205 and 206, 
which states that: (1) regulation on “[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, 
or received . . . shall be just and reasonable”; and (2) if FERC finds “any 
rate . . . unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory . . . the Commission shall 
determine the just and reasonable rate.”39 The courts have traditionally
allowed FERC to interpret sections 205 and 206 to allow regulations that affect 
wholesale rates, even if those actions also impact retail customer rates.40 
The Supreme Court in EPSA held that demand response bids and
participation directly impact wholesale sales and are within FERC’s
jurisdiction.41 However, this reversed the Appeals Court decision that found,
“[i]n ‘luring . . . retail customers’ into the wholesale market, and causing 
them to decrease ‘levels of retail electricity consumption,’ the rule engages 
in ‘direct regulation of the retail market.’”42 The Supreme Court found this
unpersuasive and reversed, moving the “bright line” separating federal and 
state regulatory authority, and stating: “We afford great deference to the 
Commission in its rate decisions.”43 Further, the Court found: “Compensation
for demand response thus directly affects wholesale prices. Indeed, it is 
hard to think of a practice that does so more.”44 
34. See Ferrey, supra note 28, at 515. 
35. An RTO coordinates, controls, and monitors a multistate electric grid. Due to
the transfer energy between states, FERC has authority to regulate RTOs. RTOs operate 
solely within the wholesale market. 
36. An ISO is similarly to an RTO but can incorporate only one state as in
California-ISO (CAISO), or between multiple states. Usually much smaller than an RTO. 
37. Ferrey, supra note 28, at 525. 
38. Ferrey, supra note 28, at n.56. 
39.  16 U.S.C. § 824(d)–(e) (2012). 
40. Ferrey, supra note 28, at 525. 
41.  FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 782 (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1
of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008)). 
44. Id. at 775. 
6
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The Court went further in holding that FERC did not intend to directly
regulate retail markets by allowing states to prohibit demand response 
participation:
[T]hat veto gives States the means to block whatever “effective” increases in retail 
rates demand response programs might be thought to produce. Wholesale demand
response as implemented in the Rule is a program of cooperative federalism, in
which the States retain the last word. That feature of the Rule removes any 
conceivable doubt as to its compliance with § 824(b)’s allocation of federal and 
state authority.45 
This extended the “bright line” to include the sense of concurrent jurisdiction.
EPSA effectively created a “blurred line” of regulatory authority that
distinguishes between the effect of the Rule and the intent of its passing. 
The Court held that, “[i]n promoting demand response, FERC did no more 
than follow the dictates of its regulatory mission to improve the competitiveness,
efficiency, and reliability of the wholesale market.”46 
Justice Kagan stated for the majority, “although (inevitably) influencing 
the retail market too, the Rule does not intrude on the States’ power to
regulate retail sales.”47 EPSA expanded federal authority to allow regulation 
if a rule “inevitably” influences the retail market. The Court’s expanded 
concurrent jurisdiction holding granted FERC almost unlimited power to 
regulate markets because in our interconnected market system almost any 
action by FERC would influence the retail market and is now allowed 
under the FPA. 
2. The Hughes v. Talen Decision 
After EPSA, another case in 2016 moved the now mythical “bright line” 
or at least what was left of it. Hughes v. Talen struck down a state law for 
interfering with FERC regulatory authority in the wholesale market.48 The 
case dealt with an attempt by the Maryland legislature to provide incentives 
for a new power plant.49 Maryland required Load Serving Entities (“LSE”s)50 
to enter into a twenty-year contract with the energy generator.51 However, 
45. Id. at 780. 
46. Id. at 779. 
47. Id. at 784. 
48. See generally Hughes v. Talen, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
49. Id. at 1299. 
50. LSEs are the energy distributors that purchase wholesale energy from RTOs/ISOs
and then sell this energy to retail customers. 
51. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294. 
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the “contract for differences” did not transfer ownership to the LSE, but 
rather allowed the energy generator to sell on the wholesale market while 
guaranteeing the contract price instead of the auction price set by FERC.52 
The Supreme Court struck down the Maryland law. The Court held that 
the law interfered with the wholesale market rates set by FERC through 
the PJM energy market53 because the “contract for differences” allowed
for a circumvention of the wholesale rates, allowing Maryland to interfere 
with the wholesale market.54 The Court stated, “Maryland’s program sets
an interstate wholesale rate, contravening the FPA’s division of authority 
between state and federal regulators.”55 The Court found that the contract 
for differences was tethered to the wholesale market, and thus impeded 
upon FERC’s authority.56 
However, the Court explained that the Hughes decision was narrow, 
and the legislation was rejected “only because it disregards an interstate
wholesale rate required by FERC.”57 Further, the Court left the door open
for states to effectuate further legislation. The Court concludes the opinion 
with “[n]othing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and 
other States from encouraging production of new clean generation through 
measures ‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.’”58 
While Hughes once again expanded federal authority over energy wholesale 
markets, Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion leaves room for states to regulate
energy markets so long as they are “untethered” to wholesale markets. 
Interpreting what “untethered” meant to the wholesale market was left to
the lower courts to decide and in 2018 two appeals courts weighed in.
B. Recent Circuit Court Decisions 
1. The EPSA v. STAR Decision 
On September 13, 2018, the Seventh Circuit upheld Illinois’ power to 
enact state regulation in the energy market. EPSA v. Star leans heavily on 
Hughes and Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of state power.59 The case
arose out of Illinois’ “enacted legislation subsidizing some of the state’s 
52. Id.
53. PJM is an RTO that manages a competitive wholesale electricity market and
coordinates the transmission of wholesale electricity over a thirteen-state region in the 
eastern United States. FERC, Electric Power Markets: PJM, https://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp?csrt=8202829176814192347 (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
54. Id. at 1299. 
55. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297. 
56. See id.
 57. Id. at 1299. 
58. Id. at 1299. 
59.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2018). 
8
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nuclear generation facilities, which the state fears will close.”60 Illinois favored
these producers by creating a “zero emission credit” (ZEC), a sellable 
commodity by low carbon emitting power producing power plants.61 High
carbon power plants (e.g. coal or gas power plants) would then be required 
to purchase ZECs to offset “the social cost of carbon.”62 Illinois derived
the cost of each ZEC from a federal working group’s calculation that was 
linked to a “market price index” derived from the annual average energy 
prices in wholesale market auctions.63 
The issue in Star arose with the setting of the price of a ZEC because 
“the price-adjustment aspect of the state’s system leads to preemption by 
the Federal Power Act because it impinges on the FERC’s regulatory
authority.”64 The impingement was that the ZEC system “indirectly regulates
the auction by using average auction prices as a component in a formula 
that affects the cost of a credit.”65 
The Seventh Circuit found that Illinois did not overstep its authority with 
the ZEC system. First, FERC determined, through an amicus brief, that 
the “program does not interfere with interstate auctions and is not otherwise 
preempted.”66 Next, the court went on to interpret Hughes to create a line 
“between state laws whose effect depends on a utility’s participation in an 
interstate auction (forbidden) and state laws that do not so depend but that 
may affect auctions (allowed).”67 The circuit court held that because Illinois’ 
ZEC program was “untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,” 
the state was free to create this regulation.68 Finally, the court held that
powers reserved to the states under the FPA may affect interstate sales; 
however, “[t]hose effects do not lead to preemption; they are instead an 
inevitable consequence of a system in which power is shared between 
state and national governments.”69 
EPSA v. Star seems to give some power back to the states to create 
regulations that might affect the wholesale market. However, the reliance
by the circuit court on dicta by Justice Ginsburg might leave the case open 




 64. Id. at 521. 
65. Id. at 522. 
66. Id.
 67. Id. at 523. 
68. Id.
 69. Elec. Power Supply Assʹn, 904 F.3d at 524. 
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to challenge in the Supreme Court, and with the current makeup of the 
Court, this seems more likely than not. 
2. The Coalition for Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman Decision
Two weeks later, the Second Circuit Court ruled on a similar ZEC program 
in New York. The New York ZEC system was challenged on both field
preemption and conflict preemption grounds after the district court dismissed 
the case on a 12(b)(6) ruling.70 The Second Circuit also relied on Hughes
and the principle of a “tether” when reaching its decision.71 
Coalition for Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman arose out of a challenge
to New York’s ZEC program, alleging the ZECs influenced the prices that 
result from a wholesale auction system created by FERC, and the program 
influenced when energy generators should close.72 New York’s ZEC
program aimed to prevent nuclear generators (which do not release carbon 
dioxide) from retiring before other renewable energy generators can be 
placed on the grid to supply retail customers with energy.73 In the New 
York system, ZECs are a subsidy provided to select plants to adjust for 
the “social cost of carbon” provided by the wholesale auction operator based 
on the plant meeting specific criteria.74 This subsidy was challenged on
the grounds that the ZEC program was both field and conflict preempted 
by FERC’s authority over wholesale prices.75 
The Second Circuit Court disagreed and ruled that, based on the recent
Hughes decision, New York’s ZEC program was not field preempted because
the program was not tethered to the wholesale prices, as they were in Hughes.76 
The Court held,
[T]hat tying retail prices (which are under state jurisdiction) to estimates of 
wholesale revenues (which are under FERC’s) is permissible because there is ‘a 
distinction between’ a state impermissibly ‘regulating [wholesale] sales’ and a 
state ‘reflecting the profits from a reasonable estimate of those sales’ when acting 
within its jurisdiction.77 
Further, there was “no support” that “tethers the ZEC plants receipt of ZECs 
to participation in the wholesale markets—the ‘fatal defect’ that doomed
70. Coalition for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2nd Cir. 2018);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
71.  Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 46. 
72. Id. at 46. 
73. Id. at 47. 
74. Id. at 47. 
75. Id. at 48. 
76. Id. at 51. 
77. Id.
10
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the contract-for-differences program in Hughes.”78 Lastly, the Court held
that “even though the ZEC program exerts downward pressure on wholesale 
electricity rates, that incidental effect is insufficient to state a claim for 
field preemption under the FPA.”79 
The conflict preemption claim was also found without merit. The FPA 
sets clear lines between state and federal jurisdiction when it comes to 
wholesale rates. The New York ZEC program was created in a “statutorily- 
defined manner, regardless of whether or how the electricity is ultimately 
sold.”80 The intent of the ZEC program was to regulate production of energy 
and not to conflict with FERC’s authority of wholesale markets. Therefore, 
no conflict preemption exists unless it can be shown to “cause clear damage 
to federal goals.”81 The circuit court found that the effect on the market 
was “at best” incidental by way of New York’s regulation on producers.82 
In the end, the circuit court held that the ZEC program did not cause clear 
damage to federal goals, and thus there was no claim to conflict preemption.
The New York ZEC program once again shows that there is still a place 
for state regulation in energy markets. However, once again the opinion 
leaned heavily on dicta from Hughes and used a subsidy program that was 
expressly invited in the opinion. The “blurred lines” created by EPSA and
Hughes have been walked back a little by the two circuit courts so far. But
it has yet to be seen if either will stand a challenge in the Supreme Court.83 
II. THE FPA AND THE WHOLESALE MARKET
A. Historical “Bright-Line” Separation
The FPA traditionally set a “bright-line” separation between federal and 
state regulation of energy markets. Section 201 of the FPA establishes 
“federal regulation of matters relating to generation . . . [or] transmission
of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”84 FERC therefore has exclusive
78. Id. at 52. 
79. Id. at 54. 
80. Id. at 54. 
81. Id. at 56. 
82. Id. at 57. 
83. At present, there is no circuit split enticing the Supreme Court to take up the
issue.
84.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
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authority to regulate electricity “transmitted from a State and consumed
at any point outside thereof,” or energy sold for resale.85 
All other sales of energy outside of this express authority, such as retail
sales, are reserved to the states to regulate energy siting regulation, or
sources of energy for retail customers.86 Congress intended for the two 
spheres of authority to be easily separated and the structure of the electric 
utility industry matched those spheres, hence the intended “bright line” in 
the regulatory scheme.
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA provide for how rates are determined. 
Sections 205 and 206 state, “[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, or 
received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission 
or sale . . . shall be just and reasonable,” and if a rate is “unjust, [or]
unreasonable . . . the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate.”87 
Sections 201, 205, and 206 have been the vehicle chosen to challenge 
FERC and state regulatory overreach. In EPSA and Hughes, as explained
above, the Supreme Court upheld challenges to each of these sections, 
expanding the interpretation of federal authority. As discussed below, the
interplay between the FPA and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) will be an important aspect of states ability to effectuate climate 
change policy in the future. 
B. Repercussions of Arlington v. FCC
In 2013, Supreme Court changed the way federal agencies interpret 
their jurisdictional authority. In Arlington v. FCC, the Court held that 
Chevron88 deference applies not only to the way the court interprets regulations, 
but also to the way the agency interprets the scope of its own statutory 
authority.89 The Court ruled, “[s]tatutory ambiguities will be resolved, within
the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the 
administering agency.”90 
Going forward, federal agencies, or independent regulatory agencies 
like FERC, are “now allowed to determine the jurisdictional scope of their
85. Id. § 824(c)–(d). 
86. Id. § 824(a). 
87. Id. § 824(d)–(e). 
88. Chevron held that a court should give deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of regulation if: (1) Congress’s intent was ambiguous as to the statute’s requirements; and 
(2) the agency’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and permissible. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
89. See Ferrey, supra note 28, at 527; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 
290 (2013).
90.  City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. at 296. 
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own authority, both substantively and procedurally.”91 This creates an
interpretive “do loop” where an agency determines if a regulatory order 
is within its authority to determine if it is within the agency’s authority to 
include such regulations as it just determined were within its authority to 
create. Arlington stands for the expansion of Chevron deference the Court 
must afford to federal agencies to determine not only their substantive 
authority, but now also their jurisdictional scope. What this means in the 
energy regulatory realm has yet to be seen, as there have yet to be any 
challenges to federal scope overreach. But the decision is in line with the 
holding in EPSA and could have significant implications for states down 
the road. 
C. State Regulatory Authority 
FPA Section 201 extends federal regulation “only to those matters which
are not subject to regulation by the States.”92 And while the Hughes decision 
preempted Maryland’s attempt to regulate wholesale sales, the opinion 
ended with a glimmer of hope for the States: “[n]othing in this opinion 
should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging
production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a 
generator’s wholesale market participation.’”93 In the two 2018 ZEC cases, 
the circuit courts have sustained preemption challenges both using the 
“untethered” language from Hughes.94 
A 2010 challenge to California’s feed-in-tariff system,95 before FERC, 
reiterated states’ authority to regulate within their borders when the regulation 
does not cross the line into federal interstate wholesale sales.96 California
enacted the feed-in-tariff system as part of its renewable energy program 
which was supposed to promote renewable generation.97 FERC found that
the part of the law that required state utilities to make wholesale purchases 
at more than FERC authorized rates was preempted. However, FERC also 
91. Ferrey, supra note 28, at 527. 
92.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
93. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
94. See Coalition for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018); Elec. 
Power Supply Assʹn v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2018); Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290. 
95. A feed‐in tariff is an offer of a guaranteed contract to an eligible renewable 
energy generator allowing for a predictable revenue stream over a specified time period 
with specified operating conditions. 
96. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, 1–2 (2010). 
97. Id.
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made clear that only the federal government could regulate wholesale rates 
between states.98 This allowed California to regulate within its borders and 
provide incentives for market participation via requirements to purchase 
power at rates different than the FERC approved rates.99 
The EPSA and Hughes decisions upheld preemption of state regulation
because the states impermissibly interfered with the wholesale markets;
however, the Court left the door open for substantial state regulation. 
Under EPSA, the Court tied the limit of state’s authority to regulate energy 
markets to that which directly affect the wholesale market.100 A state 
regulation that directly affects the wholesale market is wholly within FERC’s 
jurisdiction.101 However, when the state regulation only incidentally affects 
wholesale markets, the state is provided greater deference in its ability to 
create regulation.102 Hughes, while extending federal authority to regulate, 
also provided a guide to the states. States may create regulations to encourage 
clean energy generation if those regulations are “untethered to a generator’s 
wholesale market participation.”103 
While these two Supreme Court decisions left some room for state
regulation, they both stand for the idea that the “bright line” separation
between federal and state authority is blurred. The new idea of concurrent 
jurisdiction is one that affords great deference to federal authority. On the 
other hand, the two most recent circuit court decisions seem to walk back
federal authority and base their rulings on the most expansive language in
Hughes and provide the states with the most regulatory authority. The 
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on either case, so only time will 
tell if the circuit courts’ line of reasoning will be upheld. 
III. SB 100: CALIFORNIA’S MOST RECENT ATTEMPT TO COMBAT 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
The 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018 (SB 100) was enacted
on September 10, 2018 and set a new standard regarding California’s 
commitment to renewable energy.104 In 2002, California passed its first
Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) bill (“SB 1078”) and has amended 
98. Id. at 25–26. 
99. See id.
100.  FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774. 
101. Id.
 102. See id.
 103. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
104. Act of Sep. 10, 2018, ch. 312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified at
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
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the requirements several times since then.105 The most recent amendment 
requires 100 percent renewable resources by 2045.106 
SB 100 creates a progressive approach to reaching the 100 percent standard 
by 2045. Additionally, the statute requires retail sellers and public utilities 
to procure a minimum quantity of electricity from eligible renewable 
energy resources, so that the total kilowatt-hours sold to retail customers 
achieves 44% of retail sales by December 31, 2024, 52% by December 31, 
2027, and 60% by December 31, 2030.107 
SB 100 intends to extend and expand policies established by the California 
RPS program.108 The legislation creates an RPS program to gradually shift 
California’s energy resources to renewable sources to help fight climate 
change.109 Public Utilities Code Section 399.11(b) establishes the intent of 
the statute: “achieving the renewables portfolio standard through the 
procurement of various electricity products from eligible renewable energy 
resources. . .”110 The first two stated goals of SB 100 are: “(1) [d]isplacing 
fossil fuel consumption within the state[; and] (2) [a]dding new electrical 
generating facilities in the transmission network within the WECC service 
area.”111 The intent of SB 100 is important in determining further preemption 
challenges which are discuss below. 
Public Utilities Code Section 399.15(b)(2)(C) states, “[r]etail sellers 
shall be obligated to procure no less than the quantities associated with all
intervening years by the end of each compliance period.”112 This section 
expressly states that the statute applies to retail sellers and is an attempt to 
stave off preemption challenges. However, depending on the implementation 
plan, this may not be enough. There are still issues that may arise from the 
language of SB 100 that will be explored below. 
105. Act of Sept. 12, 2002, ch. 516, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified
at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 387, 390.1, 399.25, and 399.11). 
106. Act of Sept. 10, 2018, ch. 312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified 
at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
107. Id.
108. Act of Sept. 10, 2018, ch. 312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified 
at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
109. Id.
 110. 
111.  Id. 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(b) (2018). 
 112. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b)(2)(C) (2018). 
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IV. SB 100: PREEMPTED OR COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM? 
The following sections discuss whether SB 100 is preempted or is a new 
era of cooperative federalism between the state and federal government. 
Section A argues how FERC has authority to regulate direct effects
on wholesale sales, and how this authorization might lead to preemption 
challenges to SB 100. Section B argues how PURPA might be a pathway
or a hurdle for states to effectuate their climate change policy. And finally,
Section C argues for the states authority to regulate retail markets considering 
how the regulation will affect the wholesale market.
A. FERC’s Authority to Regulate Direct Effects on Wholesale Sales 
Enacted by thirty states over the past decades, Renewable Portfolio
Standards (“RPS”) create a more robust and diverse energy source for the 
modern electric grid.113 Now RPS programs are the leading way that states 
are combating climate change.114 California enacted its first RPS program
in 2002 and since then has increased the proportional allocation of renewable 
sources through SB 100 in 2018.115 As stated above, SB 100 mandates 100 
percent renewable sources by 2045, and possibly the more important standard 
of 60 percent by 2030.116 
FERC has the authority to regulate the interstate energy wholesale market
through the FPA. This “bright line,” as previously discussed, has been
expanded by the Supreme Court to allow for regulation by FERC, as long 
as the regulation does not have a direct effect on the retail market.117 The 
Courts expansion could have a major impact on states’ ability to implement 
new RPS regulations. An RPS program mandating more energy production 
from renewable sources could directly affect prices set on a wholesale market. 
The requirement of certain levels of renewable energy production could 
increase the cost of the wholesale market price, especially through the auction 
market. As the Supreme Court has explained “[t]he FPA ‘leaves no room 
either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales’ or 
for regulation that ‘would indirectly achieve the same result.’”118 Even
113. See Gold & Thakar, supra note 8, at 189. 
114. Id.
115. Act of Sept. 12, 2002, ch. 516, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified
at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 387, 390.1, 399.25, and 399.11); Act of Sept. 10, 2018, ch. 
312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 
399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
116. Act of Sept. 10, 2018, ch. 312, § 1, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (WEST) (to be
codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, and 399.30, and to add Section 454.53). 
117. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774. 
118. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 40, Coalition for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman,
906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654-cv) (quoting FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780). 
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though the express intent of the RPS program is to apply to retail sales of
energy, the true purpose of the program is to displace “dirty” energy generators
out of the market even if those generators are cheaper. The Court in
Hughes held, “[s]tates may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate,
through regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority over interstate 
wholesale rates.”119 Because the intent or purpose of the RPS program is
to displace market participation, the program can be seen to directly affect 
FERC’s authorized wholesale market, prompting preemption challenges. 
For example, a state mandates 100 percent renewable energy sources 
sold within the retail market. If energy generators selling the energy to
wholesale distributors do not meet the “clearing price” on the auction 
market, and therefore are not bidding in a normal open market system,
there would be an effect on the wholesale market price due to the state
regulation. Because of the state mandate of 100 percent renewable resources, 
energy generators would have to be allowed to participate in the wholesale
market even though they did not meet the clearing price, therefore
increasing the overall market price, and forcing the purchase of wholesale
energy at inflated prices created by state policy. The RPS program is
“tethered” to the wholesale market in that it is directly related to the state’s
mandate of 100 percent renewable sources forcing utilities to participate 
in the wholesale market; therefore, having an impermissible direct effect
on the market itself. This would result in a similar situation created in
Hughes, which the Supreme Court found was preempted by the FPA and
FERC’s authority. In Hughes, Maryland “require[d]” the seller to “offer 
[the] Facility’s output into the PJM Markets,” which was found to be a
tether to the wholesale market and preempted under the FPA.120 The state’s
100 percent RPS standard would now have a direct effect on FERC’s 
authorized wholesale price, and the RPS would be “tethered” to the wholesale 
market, triggering a strong preemption challenge. 
Under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, FERC has the authority to determine 
“just and reasonable” rates within the interstate wholesale market.121 In 
Hughes, the district court observed, “[w]hile Maryland may retain traditional 
state authority to regulate the development, location, and type of power 
plants within its borders . . . the scope of Maryland’s power is necessarily 
119. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298. 
120. PPL EnergyPlus LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 821, 835 (D. Md. 2013),
aff’d, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1292. 
121.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(d)–(e) (2012). 
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limited by FERC’s exclusive authority to set wholesale energy and capacity 
prices.”122 This reaffirms FERC’s exclusive authority to authorize the
energy prices within the wholesale market, and as seen in the Arlington 
decision FERC can now determine the extent of the scope of this authority.123 
Therefore, FERC can determine if it is within its exclusive authority to
authorize a rate in the wholesale market, and FERC can determine the scope
of its reach to determine what constitutes the authorizing of a rate in the 
wholesale market. Additionally, FERC can determine that RPS programs 
dictating a given allocation of renewable resources de facto authorizes a
wholesale price and preempt a state’s attempt at RPS standards under 
section 205 and 206 of the FPA to determine the “just and reasonable” rate 
in the wholesale market. 
A state cannot effectively dictate the rate that generators will receive in 
connection with energy in wholesale sales through state policies that dictate
participation in the wholesale market. In Hughes, the contract-for-differences 
was an “attempt to augment those rates, by requiring purchasers in the
wholesale market to pay additional amounts to sellers for the wholesale 
electricity they purchase, [and] is necessarily an attempt to change the rate
that FERC has approved.”124 SB 100 effectively attempts to change the
rate approved by FERC, by requiring 100 percent renewable sources with 
no regard to the effects this will have on prices in the wholesale market 
due to possibly cheaper forms of energy production. By requiring the 
generators to sell their energy into the California Independent System 
Operator’s wholesale market, SB 100 would create a mechanism “setting” 
the rate the wholesale market would have to accept because of the 100 
percent renewable requirement; essentially commandeering the wholesale 
market price. Because of the potential to have substantial and direct effects 
on the wholesale market authorized by FERC, there is a strong case for 
SB 100’s preemption. 
B. PURPA and FPA’s Scope 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 was 
implemented to encourage energy conservation, increased efficiency in 
electric facilities and resources, equitable retail rates, expeditious development 
of small-scale hydroelectric energy, and conservation of natural gas while 
122. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1295 (quoting Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 829). 
123. See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296. 
124.  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 40-41, Coalition for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman,
906 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654-cv). 
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ensuring equitable rates.125 One of the methods PURPA uses to accomplish
these goals is establishing new classes of generating facilities that would 
receive special rates and regulatory treatment, known as Qualifying Facilities 
(“QF”s).126 There are two main classes of QF’s: small power production 
facilities, and cogeneration facilities.127 18 C.F.R. sections 292.203, and
292.204 govern the size and fuel use that certifies the small production 
QFs.128  To qualify a small production energy facility’s “power production 
capacity . . . may not exceed 80 megawatts.”129 There is a further restriction
on the fuel type that qualifies, “[t]he primary energy source of the facility 
must be biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, 
or any combination thereof, and 75 percent or more of the total energy 
input must be from these sources.”130 
The relationship between the FPA and PURPA is spelled out in section 
16 U.S.C. 824(a)-3, which states that utilities must be able to sell electric 
energy to small production QF and must purchase electric energy from 
these same QFs.131 PURPA is a substantial reason that renewable small 
production facilities have been successful so far. The law requires that 
utilities buy and sell power with these QFs, allowing them to become 
players in the market.132 Further, the rates shall be just and reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory against the small production QFs.133 This allows these
QFs to fully participate on a level playing field with larger utilities. 
With respect to SB 100, PURPA will be a strong ally in the goal of
bringing 100 percent renewable resources to the grid by 2045. To meet 
this goal, new electric facilities will need to be brought online and integrated 
into the grid. Small production facilities offering renewable energy will 
be the most likely candidate to accomplish these goals. The interplay between
PURPA and the FPA will require the utilities to purchase energy from the
small production QFs, enhancing the ability to meet the 100 percent renewable 
resource goal by 2045.
125. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, What is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC.GOV,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp [https://perma.cc/RE29-
HZRQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
126. Id.
 127. Id.
128.  18 C.F.R. §§ 292.203 to .204 (2010). 
129.  Id. § 292.204(a). 
130.  Id. § 292.204(b). 
131.  16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a) (2012). 
132.  Id. 
 133. Id. § 824a-3(b). 
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Under section 824a-3(b)(2), the rate that a QF receives shall not “exceed[s] 
the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”134 
Incremental cost of alternative energy is defined as “the cost to the electric
utility of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator 
or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from 
another source.”135 This may be a future hurdle for SB 100. If the wholesale
price of energy resources such as natural gas continues to be lower than 
those of renewable, PURPA and the FPA could be used to derail the renewable 
energy efforts based on a “just and reasonable” rate position, and under 
the incremental cost section. 
However, FERC issued a ruling in 2011 that negates this possible reading
of “incremental cost of alternative energy.”136 FERC issued a Clarification 
Order on CPUC’s authority in California to determine rates under PURPA.137 
FERC explains that it is up to states to determine the sources that go into 
“avoided cost” calculations, “where a state requires a utility to procure energy 
from generators with certain characteristics, generators with those characteristics
constitute the sources that are relevant to the determination of the utility’s
avoided cost for that procurement requirement,”138 and that “an avoided
cost rate may also reflect a state requirement that utilities purchase their 
energy needs from, for example, renewable resources.”139 Therefore, “in 
theory a utility might have a cheaper source of . . . energy available to it, 
in calculating an avoided cost rate a state may properly look at the actual 
sources of . . . energy available to the electric utility, rather than at some 
theoretical source, which is not permitted by state law, that may be cheaper.”140 
The Order gives authority to states to regulate procurement requirements
from QFs, and authorizes RPS programs that might have an indirect effect
on the wholesale market. 
C. State Authority to Regulate Retail Sales Under 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
There is a presumption that a federal statutory scheme does not preempt 
state laws (especially when the statutory scheme separates federal and state
roles). Where “coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary
administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the 
134. Id. § 824a-3(b)(2). 
135. Id. § 824a-3(d).
136. California Public Utilities Commission, 134 FERC ¶ 61,044 (2011); 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a-3(b)(2). 
137.  California Public Utilities Commission, 134 FERC ¶ 61,044 (2011). 
138. Id. at 15. 
139. Id. at 16. 
140. Id.
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case for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one.”141 Further,
the “presumption against preemption of state laws dictates that a law must 
do ‘major damage’ to clear and substantial federal interests before the 
supremacy clause will demand that state law surrenders to federal regulation.”142 
When the FPA was enacted by Congress it expressly divided the roles 
between federal and state powers. SB 100 and California’s RPS program 
fall within the realm of state power envisioned under the FPA. The RPS 
program does not “directly intervene” or “stand as an obstacle” to the FPA
and should not be preempted.143 Additionally, SB 100 has only an “incidental
effect” on FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale sales and is not “tethered” 
to the wholesale market.144 
The FPA gives states the authority to regulate “new power facilities,
their economic feasibility, and [retail] rates and services.”145 The FPA
expressly states that FERC “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used 
for the generation of electric energy.”146 In Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 
the Court upheld a state regulation against a preemption challenge because 
it merely “affected” FERC’s wholesale rates.147 The Court stated this rule 
would go against the states’ authority in the FPA.148 
The RPS system is within the states’ authority under the FPA. California 
created SB 100 to fight climate change and better the health and safety of
its residents, a power traditionally read to be wholly within a state’s police 
power. Section 399.11(b)(3)-(4) states the goal as, “(3) [r]educing air pollution, 
particularly criteria pollutant emissions and toxic air contaminants, in the 
state[, and] (4) [m]eeting the state’s climate change goals by reducing
141. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing New York State 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)). 
142. Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 3-4, Elec. 
Power Supply Assʹn v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 17-2443, 17-2445) 
(quoting Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041, 1050 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
143. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297; Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1595. 
144. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298–99. 
145.  Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 6, Coalition for
Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654) (quoting Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 
(1983)).
146.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
147. Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 7, Coalition
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654) (quoting Oneok, 
135 S. Ct. at 1600–1601). 
148. Id.
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emissions of greenhouse gases associated with electrical generation.”149 
Allowing the state to regulate power generation for environmental benefits is
critical for a state to meet its objectives to protect the environment, health, 
and safety of its lands and citizens. Therefore, SB 100’s RPS mandate is
not preempted under the FPA because it seeks to regulate energy generation 
within the authority expressly granted to states under the FPA. 
Using the same scenario from above, the RPS program would be only
an “incidental effect” on the wholesale market price system.150 As seen 
with the two circuit court ZEC cases, when a state tries to regulate energy 
production and the effect of the state regulation affects the wholesale 
market in an incidental way, the courts have consistently upheld the state 
regulation.151 Further, as discussed above with respect to PURPA, states
can dictate renewable resource allocation from QFs. A state can overcome 
the “avoided cost” requirement of PURPA through RPS programs. The 
incremental cost of energy that SB 100 requires is measured against the 
cost of other renewable resources, or QF, in California, not potentially cheaper 
forms of energy not permitted under state law.
SB 100 does not create an RPS program that is “tethered” to the wholesale
market to preempt it under the FPA.152 The Court in Hughes defined “tethered” 
as “condition[ing] payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction.”153 
California’s RPS program through SB 100 does not create a pricing regime 
that is tethered to the wholesale market. In fact, there is no pricing regime
or mention of any wholesale rate auction at all in SB 100.154 
States have the authority to “encourage production of new or clean 
generation.”155 The RPS program does nothing more than encourage the
states to seek new and clean forms of electric generation for environmental 
protection, an area traditionally left to state regulation. SB 100 and the RPS 
program encourages the production of renewable energy, an act within the 
authority granted to states in the FPA. The RPS program does not displace 
wholesale pricing and is therefore not tethered to the wholesale market to 
create a preempted activity. 
149. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(b)(3)-(4) (2018). 
150. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298. 
151. See generally Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, (7th Cir. 2018); Coalition
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 2018). 
152. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
153. Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11, Coalition
For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654) (quoting 
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299). 
154. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (2018); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15 (2018); 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30 (2018); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.53 (2018). 
155. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
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Incidental impact on wholesale pricing does not prompt preemption
either. SB 100 directs California to source electric energy from an increasing 
amount of renewable resources through 2045, which will have only 
incidental impact on the wholesale market due to the higher availability
of energy sources. California argues this fact in its Amicus Brief to the
Second Circuit concerning the New York ZEC program: “merely because 
the supply of electricity available . . . was increased, placing a downward
pressure on wholesale prices,”156 the incidental effect on wholesale prices 
did not amount to regulation of the wholesale market.157 The economic
realities of supply and demand should only amount to an incidental effect 
on wholesale markets. The Allco court went on to opine that under Hughes 
an incidental effect on wholesale prices does not amount to regulation of 
interstate wholesale sales.158 Thus, the RPS program under SB 100 is not
preempted by doing much the same, while encouraging further development 
of renewable energy sources, and directing that California shift all retail 
electric consumption to renewable resources by 2045; California has only 
incidentally effected wholesale sales. As ruled in Hughes, a state may regulate 
“within the domain Congress assigned to them, even when their laws incidentally 
affect areas within FERC’s domain.”159 
V. CONCLUSION
SB 100 and the California RPS aim to combat climate change by mandating 
100 percent renewable energy to retail customers by 2045. The FPA gives 
FERC the authority to regulate interstate wholesale markets, and leaves to
states the regulation of power generation and resource allocation. EPSA
held that electric markets are not “hermetically sealed” from one another 
with regards to federal and state regulations.160 RPS programs’ success
depends on the ability of states to regulate the production of energy, which 
is necessary for environmental policies desired by states. To hold that RPS 
programs, especially SB 100, are preempted due to their effects on wholesale 
156. Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11, Coalition
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2654); see also 
Allco Finance Ltd v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 100 (2d Cir. 2017). 
157. Id.
 158. Id.
 159. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298. 
160.  FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. 
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markets would effectively neutralize the states’ ability to enact climate
change policies.
Going forward, the states can use the lessons of EPSA, Hughes, Star, 
and Zibelman to encourage state regulation of renewable energy allocation. 
The Supreme Court has expanded federal authority over energy regulation
but leaves a glimmer of hope to the states. Two circuit courts latched onto
this opening to uphold state regulation over ZEC programs expanding the 
tools states can use to effectuate clean energy generation. Going forward,
California’s success in regulating energy policies, especially through RPS 
programs, will depend on future courts interpreting the new standard of 
concurrent jurisdiction.
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